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Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity
ABSRACT: Epistemologists disagree about whether there are categorical epistemic norms or all epistemic normativity is hypothetical. I examine an argument purporting to show there must be categorical epistemic norms because the very possibility of hypothetical normativity of any kind requires them. The argument fails because it assumes a person must be bound by epistemic norms to have justified beliefs. This is an assumption opponents of categorical epistemic normativity can consistently reject, and there are good independent grounds for doing so.

1.	Introduction
Some of our beliefs are justified, and others are not. The justified beliefs are candidates for knowledge. The unjustified beliefs cannot be knowledge, even if they are true. Epistemology concerns itself with two questions about this sort of justification.
First: What is the difference between justified and unjustified beliefs? Ordinarily, philosophers think it has something to do with the relationship between a belief and one’s reasons for holding it, or with what caused the belief. (These two factors are not exclusive of one another.)
Second: Why does it appear that justified beliefs are better than unjustified beliefs, and why does it appear that our beliefs ought to be justified? People tend to prefer justified beliefs to unjustified ones, and people tend to think it is wrong, in some sense, to believe something without justification. To answer the second question is to explain why that is so.
This paper concerns two approaches to the second question. The first, categoricalism, holds that justified believing is intrinsically valuable. Alternatively, categoricalists hold that merely having a mind at all brings with it an obligation to have justified rather than unjustified beliefs. The second approach, hypotheticalism, holds that justified believing is instrumentally valuable. On this view, having justified beliefs is not good in itself. Instead, justified believing is valuable as a means to some ulterior end. Alternatively, hypotheticalists might hold that one’s beliefs ought to be justified because justified believing is an effective way to achieve some further good.
Harvey Siegel has argued that hypotheticalism is self-defeating (1990; 1996). Unless categoricalism is true, he thinks, there can be no instrumental value and there can be nothing a person ought to do in pursuit of an end. So, if justified believing is instrumentally valuable or our beliefs ought to be justified because justified believing is an effective means to a valuable end, then it must also be the case either that justified believing is intrinsically valuable or that merely having a mind obliges one to have justified (rather than unjustified) beliefs.
Siegel is mistaken, and my aim in this paper is to explain why. His argument depends on an assumption to the effect that people must be bound by epistemic norms to have justified beliefs. Roughly, a norm binds someone when it makes a legitimate claim on her behavior. This is a logically stronger relation than the mere applicability of a norm to someone. When a norm is applicable to a person, it is possible sensibly to appraise her performance in light of the norm, even if the norm makes no legitimate claim on her behavior. Siegel’s bindingness assumption is reasonable given categoricalism. Hypotheticalists, however, can consistently reject it, and they have independent reason for doing so. Once the bindingness assumption is replaced with the weaker assumption that justified believing requires the applicability of epistemic norms, Siegel’s argument becomes invalid. By depending on the bindingness assumption, then, the argument against hypotheticalism begs the question.
Section 2 introduces some terminology and clarifies the disagreement between categoricalists and hypotheticalists. Section 3 summarizes Siegel’s argument, and Section 4 explains its mistake. Section 5 evaluates a couple of moves that could be made in defense of Siegel’s argument, and Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion of how the hypotheticalism/categoricalism debate bears on some other issues in epistemology.

2.	Hypotheticalism vs. Categoricalism: The Issue
There are two ways to formulate the “problem of epistemic normativity”:
1.	Why do justified beliefs appear to be more valuable than unjustified beliefs?
2.	Why ought one’s beliefs be justified rather than unjustified?
An answer to either question might well provide an answer to the other. For example, one might think justified beliefs are more valuable than unjustified beliefs because one’s beliefs ought to be justified rather than unjustified. The idea here is that fulfilling obligations is valuable. On the other hand, one might think our beliefs ought to be justified (rather than unjustified) because justified beliefs are more valuable than unjustified beliefs. The idea here is that what one ought to do is directed at what is valuable.
Eliminativism about epistemic normativity is another possible view. According to eliminativism, justification might seem valuable, and it might seem that our beliefs ought to be justified, but these are mere appearances. In fact, says the eliminativist, justified believing is not valuable, and it is false that our beliefs ought to be justified rather than unjustified. I will assume eliminativism is false.
Barring eliminativism, there is such a phenomenon as epistemic normativity. Justified beliefs, that is, really are more valuable than unjustified beliefs, and our beliefs really ought to be justified rather than unjustified. This much is common ground between categoricalism and hypotheticalism.
As is customary, let us say something is intrinsically valuable if and only if it is valuable in itself, independently of its relations to other things. And let us say something is instrumentally valuable if and only if it is valuable as a means to some further valuable end. The feeling of pleasure may be intrinsically valuable; we like it for its own sake, and we probably are not mistaken about why it is good. Money is instrumentally valuable; it is good because it is useful in obtaining other valuable things.
It is also customary to distinguish between categorical and hypothetical rules. A rule is categorical if and only if one ought (at least prima facie) to obey it independently of any considerations about one’s particular ends, values, or goals. A rule is hypothetical if and only if those who ought (at least prima facie) to obey it ought to do so because that would promote their ends, goals, or values.​[1]​
The moral imperative to respect others’ rights might be categorical. If someone has a right, that alone is sufficient to oblige us (at least prima facie) not to violate that right. It does not matter what our ends or goals are.​[2]​
An example of a hypothetical rule might be:
Those who wish to lose weight ought to exercise more and eat less.
The rule tells us only what those with a certain goal – losing weight – ought to do. If it makes any claim on a person’s behavior, it makes that claim because exercising more and eating less would promote one’s goal of losing weight. If one does not wish to lose weight, the rule makes no claim on one’s behavior.
Now we can characterize categoricalism and hypotheticalism more precisely:
	Categoricalism: The view that either epistemic justification is intrinsically valuable or the rules compliance with which constitutes justified believing are categorical.
	Hypotheticalism: The view that (i) either epistemic justification is instrumentally valuable or the rules compliance with which constitutes justified believing are hypothetical, and (ii) categoricalism is false.
Let us summarize categoricalism as the claim that epistemic normativity is “categorical,” and let us summarize hypotheticalism as the claim that it is “(only) hypothetical.”
The debate between hypotheticalists and categoricalists thus comes down to a debate over the role of our paradigmatically “epistemic” ends, such as believing important truths, avoiding belief in dangerous falsehoods, and tracking the weight of the evidence with our beliefs. For hypotheticalists, such ends play a crucial normative role. All epistemic value derives from the promotion of the characteristically epistemic ends, and whatever rules make for epistemic justification are rules concerning how best to pursue such ends. On the other hand, categoricalists treat epistemic value as intrinsic, rather than goal-directed, and they think of the rules of epistemic justification as categorical rules that do not concern the promotion of epistemic ends.​[3]​
Below, I use ‘norm’ as a general term covering both rules and evaluative principles – i.e., principles concerning what sorts of things have what sorts of value and why. Norms are categorical when they are either categorical rules or principles concerning intrinsic value. They are hypothetical when they are either hypothetical rules or principles concerning instrumental value. In these terms, categoricalists believe there are categorical epistemic norms, and hypotheticalists believe there are hypothetical but not categorical epistemic norms. To “apply” a norm is to judge whether someone’s conduct conforms (or would conform) to what a rule requires, or to assess something’s value in light of the norm. In either case, I will sometimes describe the application of a norm as assessing something in terms of the standard the norm sets.
Siegel (1990; 1996) claims there can be no hypothetical epistemic norms unless categoricalism is true. If he is right, hypotheticalism is self-defeating. In denying there are categorical epistemic norms, it would undermine the possibility that there are hypothetical ones.

3.	Siegel’s Argument for Categorical Epistemic Norms
Siegel (1990; 1996) appears to argue that there could be no hypothetical normativity at all without categorical epistemic norms. This section lays out what I take to be his case for that claim, and I discuss its weaknesses in Section 4.
The argument begins with considerations about when one would be instrumentally rational (i.e., instrumentally justified​[4]​) in conforming to a rule associating ends and means. Suppose Mark is a smoker who wants better health, and consider the following rule:
S	To improve your health, stop smoking.
Prima facie, the correctness of S indicates that Mark ought to stop smoking. Siegel (1990, pp. 303-304) emphasizes, however, that such prima facie assessments gloss over an important aspect of instrumental or practical rationality. We might suppose Mark is not epistemically justified in believing that stopping smoking will improve his health. Maybe he doesn’t believe that at all, or maybe he does believe it, but for the wrong reasons. In such a case, it would be wrong for Mark to follow the rule S expresses. He would be either following a rule he does not endorse or following a rule he is unjustified in endorsing. Either way, he would be acting irrationally.
Apparently, then, just having the relevant ends is not enough to make a correct hypothetical rule bind one. Additionally, one needs to believe the rule is correct (i.e., the prescribed means promote the indicated end), and that belief needs to be justified. We can summarize this in the following principle of bindingness for hypothetical rules:
B	For any agent A, time t, and correct hypothetical rule R, A is bound by R at t only if (i) A has the end (or ends) specified in R at t, (ii) A believes at t that doing what R says at t will promote that end (or those ends), and (iii) A is justified at t in so believing.
Now suppose the norms of epistemic justification are hypothetical rules. B would then imply:
J	For any agent A, time t, and correct hypothetical epistemic rule E, E binds A at t only if (i) A has the sort of evidence E indicates at t, (ii) A has the epistemic end (or ends) specified in E at t, (iii) A believes at t that conforming to E will promote that end (or those ends), and (iv) A is justified at t in so believing.​[5]​
J, however, seems to lead to a vicious regress. Suppose I am justified in believing snow falls from the sky. By J, it would appear I must be justified in endorsing a rule, E, telling me to believe snow falls from the sky given my evidence. My justification for endorsing that rule, however, would depend on my justification for endorsing some rule E*, telling me the means E prescribes promote my epistemic ends. And my justification for endorsing E* would depend in turn on my justification for endorsing some E**, and so on. If the regress is infinite or circular, it would appear to make epistemic justification impossible. And, given B, the impossibility of epistemic justification would apparently make instrumentally rational action impossible as well.
To stop the regress, Siegel thinks we must posit a level of categorical epistemic norms. These norms bind everyone – no matter what they happen to want or believe. Because they are categorical, their bindingness is not subject to the sorts of restrictions B sets out, and there is no principle analogous to J for them. Epistemic justification comes from doing what those rules say.
Thus, in Siegel’s view, it is incoherent to hold that all epistemic norms are hypothetical. Some of them must be categorical, or else hypothetical normativity in general would be impossible, since hypothetical normativity depends on epistemically justified endorsement of rules relating means to ends. In one place, he states his view as follows:
... claims concerning instrumental efficacy [e.g., hypothetical epistemic norms] presuppose, and depend for their own justification on, a non-instrumental (and in that sense ‘categorical’) relation between such claims and the evidence for them. That relation cannot itself be understood in terms of instrumental efficacy: it is not that regarding the evidence for such a claim as powerful is a matter of seeing that regarding it in that way serves to further some other goal that we happen to have. Rather, the evidence must establish it as justified or warranted that the means is indeed instrumentally efficacious with respect to the goal. This relation, between the evidence which justifies and the claim (concerning instrumental efficacy) which it renders justified, is just the traditional (categorical) epistemic relation between a claim or belief and the reasons or evidence which support(s) it. Thus the instrumentalist-only normative [epistemologist] requires a non-instrumental [i.e., categorical] account of evidential support or epistemic warrant; she needs a ‘categorical’, i.e. non-instrumental, normative theory of evidence to make her instrumental story work. (1996: 102)
I argue below that Siegel assumes epistemic norms must bind a person for her to have justified beliefs. This is an assumption hypotheticalists will not accept, and there is good independent reason to reject it. A belief’s epistemic status depends not on what norms bind the believer, but on what norms are applicable to her.

4.	What is Wrong with Siegel’s Argument
4.1. The Regress Engine
I will assume, with Siegel, that B is correct and there is nothing wrong with inferring J from it. This alone is not enough to drive the regress in Siegel’s argument. To get the regress out of J, we must make a further “Bindingness Assumption” linking epistemic justification to being bound by epistemic norms:
BA	To have justified beliefs, a person must be bound by the relevant epistemic norms.
We can distinguish the question whether a norm binds someone from the question whether it is applicable to her. In the former case, she has at least a prima facie obligation to do as the norm says or to be motivated by the sort of value the norm concerns. In the latter case, it makes sense to assess her or her conduct in light of the norm, whether it binds her or not. Given this distinction, we can contrast BA with the “Applicability Assumption”:
AA	To have justified beliefs, the relevant epistemic norms must be applicable to one.
AA is trivial; it says only that a person cannot have justified beliefs unless it makes sense to categorize her beliefs as justified or not. BA, however, says a person cannot have justified beliefs unless she is obligated to have justified beliefs. It is well worth wondering whether this further claim has any merit.
There is a straightforward argument from categoricalism to BA. A rule is categorical when it binds everyone, regardless of their particular ends. So, it would seem that any categorical rule applicable to a person also binds her. An evaluative principle is categorical when it concerns intrinsic value. On the plausible supposition that people ought to be motivated by intrinsic value, no matter what ends they happen to have, it then follows that categorical evaluative principles bind everyone in much the same way as categorical rules. Consequently, categorical evaluative principles bind everyone to whom they are applicable. Since epistemic norms are applicable to everyone who is even a candidate for having justified beliefs, justification would require being bound by them if categoricalism were true.
Such a defense of BA would be useless in defending Siegel’s regress. The regress is part of a reductio against hypotheticalism. It would beg the question to defend one of its premises by appeal to categoricalism.
To avoid the regress, hypotheticalists need to reject BA, and they need to do so without also sacrificing the trivial truth AA. It should be possible to do this coherently, provided that AA really is logically weaker than BA.
4.2. The Logical Weakness of AA
B suggests three ways a person might fail to be bound by a hypothetical norm. She might lack the relevant ends, she might not endorse the norm, or she might endorse the norm without epistemic justification. Each possibility provides cases in which a hypothetical norm applies to a person without binding her.
Suppose Jeff is playing blackjack, and also suppose the following common betting principle is correct:
DD	To maximize your winnings (without counting cards), double down when dealt 11 against a dealer showing 6.
We can imagine Jeff is dealt 11 against a dealer showing 6, and he doubles down. DD is applicable to Jeff, and we can easily see that (so far as DD is concerned) he has made a good bet.
Now suppose Jeff is trying to lose money for some reason or other. DD does not bind him; he is under no obligation to double down in this circumstance. But that does not make it nonsense to say Jeff made a good bet -- though we might quickly add that he is trying not to make good bets and bungling the job of it. The hypothetical rule applies to Jeff without binding him.
Even if Jeff is trying to maximize his winnings, he might simply fail to endorse DD. Maybe he doesn’t know any principles of betting in blackjack, and maybe he doubles down in this case because he endorses the gambler’s fallacy. This is the sort of case in which we might say Jeff made a good bet for bad reasons. The bet is good because DD is correct, and DD does not have to bind Jeff for his bet to be good. We apply the norm even though it does not bind him.
Finally, we might suppose Jeff does endorse DD, but without justification. For example, he might have learned DD from a person he knows to have given him nothing but bad betting advice in the past. According to B, DD does not bind Jeff. But once more, we find that Jeff’s bet is still a good one in light of DD, and we do not hesitate to apply the norm despite its not binding him.
When the norms in question are hypothetical, applicability is a considerably weaker relation than bindingness. The point of Siegel’s argument is to show that hypotheticalism entails an absurdity, and the argument turns on BA. In general, however, we cannot infer the bindingness of a hypothetical norm from its applicability. This puts a burden of proof on defenders of the regress argument: For the argument to have any bite, they need to give reasons why hypotheticalists should accept BA even though the bindingness of hypothetical norms is logically stronger than their applicability. Siegel does not attempt to discharge this burden, and I doubt anyone could.
4.3. Why We Should Reject BA
If BA were true, having an unjustified belief would always involve a breach of some obligation. We need to be clear about just how strong a claim this is. It would be a little misleading to summarize it as the claim that our beliefs ought to be justified. That is something hypotheticalists would agree with, but in a very different sense of ‘ought’.
On the reading of ‘Our beliefs ought to be justified’ that makes BA true, the norms of epistemic justification make a claim on our behavior such that failing to meet their standard would constitute a violation of one’s obligations. The obligations need only be prima facie; in particular circumstances violating them might be excusable. But in the absence of an excuse, one would be blameworthy for violating the obligations. That is, blame would be an appropriate attitude to take towards a person with an unjustified belief.
It is worth confirming this is a consequence of BA. ‘Our beliefs ought to be justified’ could be interpreted in any of the following ways:
One is obligated to have justified beliefs and not to have unjustified ones.
We typically prefer for people to have justified and not unjustified beliefs.
Having justified beliefs is better than having unjustified beliefs.
The latter two interpretations are perfectly consistent with the denial of BA. To say our beliefs “ought to be justified” in either of those senses is not to imply that the norms of justification actually do bind all believers. Only on the first interpretation, the interpretation concerning obligation, do we have a gloss that reflects BA. And on that interpretation, having unjustified beliefs becomes an example of doing what one is obligated not to do. It becomes an example of the sort of thing one can be appropriately blamed for.
Contrapositively, if unjustified believing is not an appropriate target of blame, then BA is false. Assessing a belief as unjustified need not involve taking an attitude of blame toward the believer, and it is very often inappropriate to take such an attitude in response to people’s unjustified beliefs.
William Alston (1985) considers the question whether having justified beliefs is a matter of being epistemically blameless in the sense of not violating any epistemic obligations. He gives several examples illustrating the ways in which a belief might be blameless and yet unjustified. One of them involves cases of cultural isolation. Suppose I am a member of a culture whose traditions include (a) predicting the future by reading tea leaves and (b) never questioning traditional divinatory practices. We might even suppose the second tradition is very well-entrenched and enforced by a system of strong taboos. When I read the tea leaves and come to believe next year’s harvest will be small, my belief is unjustified. But it is also blameless. It seems silly to blame me for doing just what my culture has always done. I could hardly be expected to do otherwise.
Exotic cases of cultural isolation are not the only ones to show that unjustified believing is not always blameworthy. We need only realize that blame is not an epistemological category. On those occasions when we do adopt a negative attitude towards someone, owing to her epistemic performance, there is usually some further, non-epistemic reason for our attitude. Markus Lammenranta puts the point this way:
If someone just does not want to find out whether her husband is faithful to her [and thus actively avoids uncovering evidence that he is not], we are in no position as epistemologists to say to her that she ought to. The problem lies elsewhere. (1998: 341)
Grocers, we might suppose, have moral or legal obligations to know whether their milk has spoiled, and not to sell spoiled milk. Suppose Mr. Hooper believes his milk is fresh, but only because he has actively ignored evidence it has spoiled. We might well blame Mr. Hooper for selling spoiled milk, and we might blame him for his epistemic negligence. But we assign the blame for ulterior reasons. We do not assign purely epistemic blame for the violation of a purely epistemic rule (not to ignore evidence). We assign legal or moral blame to him for violating his legal or moral obligations. Hooper has a moral obligation to do something epistemic, viz. not to ignore evidence his milk has spoiled. When he violates that obligation, he is due moral blame. To think of him as epistemically blameworthy is to confuse the subject matter of an obligation with its source.
BA treats justified believing as something we are obligated to do, and it treats unjustified believing as a violation of our obligations. As such, unjustified believing becomes an appropriate target for blame. If BA were true, that is, people would be blameworthy for their poor epistemic performances. However, people are not typically blameworthy for poor epistemic performance. In Alston-style cases, they are not blameworthy because they could have done no better than they actually did (or it is unreasonable to expect them to do any better), and it is inappropriate to blame people who could not (or could not be expected to) do better. More generally, however, we find that our negative attitudes towards people’s poor epistemic performances are not purely epistemic. Unjustified beliefs are not blameworthy because they are violations of binding epistemic obligations. When they are blameworthy, it is because they are violations of other binding obligations, such as moral obligations, whose content happens to be epistemic. Because there is no purely epistemic blame, BA must not be true.
4.4. AA, Hypotheticalism, and the Problem of Normativity
The argument above is not conclusive. In response, defenders of BA could argue as follows:
All the considerations marshaled against BA are perfectly consistent with the existence of prima facie epistemic obligations conformity to which is constitutive of epistemic justification. If a person has a blameless unjustified belief, we need not consider her blameless because there is no obligation she is violating. We need only suppose she has some legitimate excuse – such as being unable to do any better or its being no one else’s business what she thinks – that overrides her blameworthiness. And if blame for poor epistemic performance ordinarily includes a moral, legal, or other non-epistemic dimension, it still might have a purely epistemic dimension as well. So, BA could be true even if everything you have said against it is right.
Such a defense is inadequate in the context of Siegel’s regress argument. For that argument to be a successful reductio of hypotheticalism, it is not enough for BA to be possibly true. We need either strong reasons to think BA is true, independent of the categoricalism/hypotheticalism debate, or, failing that, we need reasons to think BA is something hypotheticalists are committed to. Otherwise, the regress argument would just beg the question.
Now, there are some reasons for thinking BA is true that are independent of the categoricalism/hypotheticalism debate. If they are strong enough, they would show that hypotheticalists ought to endorse BA, and then the regress argument against hypotheticalism would work.
The best reason for endorsing BA is its apparent explanatory power. We commonly assess people’s epistemic performance without first asking ourselves whether they care about characteristically epistemic ends such as truth, empirical adequacy, the avoidance of error, etc. And when we discover someone has an unjustified belief, we often do feel disappointed or let down. If BA were true, and we were aware of its truth, those practices would be entirely unsurprising. Our reactions to one another’s epistemic performances would derive from the fact that we are holding each other up to epistemic standards we all ought to do our best to meet. We could then solve the problem of epistemic normativity by saying our beliefs ought to be justified in the sense that that is our epistemic obligation, and justified beliefs are better than unjustified ones because they fulfill our epistemic obligations.
To save their position from the regress, hypotheticalists need to reject BA. To reject BA, though, they need to show how we can explain our responses to one another’s epistemic performances without appeal to it. If our negative attitude towards the unjustified beliefs of others is not blame, then what is it? And how is it that our beliefs ought to be justified though there is no obligation to have justified beliefs?
To begin answering these questions, we can observe that we have an interest not only in the justification of our own beliefs, but in the justification of the beliefs of others.​[6]​ It is typically assumed that justified beliefs are more likely to guide successful action than unjustified beliefs. It is natural, then, that we would prefer to have justified rather than unjustified beliefs; they are more useful to us.
It might be hard to see, at first, why we would care whether other people’s beliefs are justified. After all, my beliefs guide my actions, not your beliefs. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons why people have an interest in the justification of others’ beliefs.
The more obvious reason involves one’s use of others as information sources. Many of the problems we face in everyday life are best solved on the basis of information we get from other people. We could respond to this information in either of two ways. What I call the Humean response is to take the testimony of others as nothing but a source of new hypotheses, which must then be independently checked and confirmed before one believes them. In contrast, the Reidian response is to accept the testimony of others by default, unless one has specific reasons for not doing so in particular circumstances. Our response to the testimony of others is typically Reidian, and the Reidian strategy is obviously less demanding than the Humean. But the Reidian response is also more efficient, if certain conditions are met. The first condition is just that, if x tells p to y, then if x is justified in believing p, y’s independent investigations of the matter would lead to y’s being justified in believing p. The second is that people’s testimony generally reflects what they are justified in believing. Given that these two conditions are met, we could act on the basis of other people’s testimony with almost as much likelihood of success as we would have acting on our own, justified beliefs.
We have an interest in other people’s beliefs’ justification, then, because those other people are potential information sources for us, and we want their information to be reliable. If we discover that someone has an unjustified belief, we will have discovered that that person is not a reliable information source on the matter at hand. It is good for us when other people’s beliefs are justified, because we can get reliable information from them that will be useful in the pursuit of our own ends.
A second reason we have an interest in the justification of others’ beliefs derives from the fact that it is often in our interest for their actions to be guided by justified beliefs. Sometimes, this is simply because the success of our own actions depends on the success of others’, and their actions are more likely to be successful if guided by justified beliefs. This might be because we are relying on others in some cooperative activity, or it might be because others are acting as our agents.
The recent controversy over the Bush administration’s use of intelligence concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction illustrates the second sort of case very nicely. The government, acting as the agent of the American people, went to war with Iraq because those in power believed Iraq posed an immediate threat to American security. Because of the risks inherent in starting a war (especially in the diplomatic context of the second Gulf War), it is important that the decision whether to start a war be made on the basis of justified beliefs. Making it on the basis of unjustified beliefs would only magnify the risks.
Many people in Britain and the United States, including some who initially supported the war, now believe unjustified beliefs about the Iraqi threat guided the decision to go to war. They claim that the Bush administration overestimated the threat and maintained that belief by distorting, misinterpreting, and misapplying the available evidence (Gellman & Pincus 2003). If this charge is correct, then the government put national security (as well as the lives of a great many Americans, Iraqis, and others) at risk in the absence of good reasons for thinking the result would be increased American security. Americans have an interest in American national security, and so they have an interest in the justification of the beliefs of those who make national security decisions.
Even apart from our reliance on political leaders to have justified beliefs, much of what we do depends in some way on what other people do and believe. When we can rely on others to have justified rather than unjustified beliefs, we take less risk putting our welfare in their hands, whether they are political leaders, other drivers on the highway, or other players on one’s softball team.
Notice that our interest in the justification of others’ beliefs does not require us to suppose they care about such things as believing what is true and not false or keeping their beliefs properly tuned to the weight of the available evidence. We (those who care about such things) probably have good reasons for caring, but other people might see things differently. They might profess indifference to such ends. Even if they do not care about those characteristically epistemic ends, the fact that we do can lead us to care about the epistemic status of others’ beliefs. When others have unjustified beliefs, they are letting us down.
Here, then, is how the hypotheticalist might get by without BA: Our negative response to other people’s unjustified beliefs derives from the fact that we have an interest in others’ beliefs’ justification. A person who has an unjustified belief lets us down by doing something that is against our interests. The response is not blame, but just the same sort of negative feeling that arises whenever someone does anything that is against one’s interests. Justified beliefs are better than unjustified beliefs in the sense that they score higher on hypothetical (i.e., instrumental), epistemic scales, but we have strong reasons for caring about how beliefs score on those scales, no matter whose they are. Beliefs “ought” to be justified not in the sense of epistemic obligation, but in the sense that that is how we tend to want beliefs to be, whether they are our own or someone else’s.
If this approach is right, we should expect to find ourselves more let down by some unjustified beliefs than others. In particular, our response to another person’s unjustified belief should be much more negative when we are relying on that person for our own actions than when we are not. On the other hand, if BA were true, we might expect to find that our negative responses to people’s unjustified beliefs are all basically equal, since they all equally involve the violation of an epistemic obligation.
But now suppose there is a person on the other side of the world who has looked at all the evidence, consistently ignored most of it, and concluded that alien spacecraft regularly visit this planet. We might as well add that this person does not care about characteristically epistemic ends, but also will never reveal her position on the matter of alien visitors to anyone else. Most people might think of this person as odd, but we probably would not have an especially strong negative response.
On the other hand, consider a clearer case of violating an obligation. Suppose someone on the other side of the world ruthlessly tortures a stray cat to death. Imagine this action will have no particular consequences for anyone around this person and definitely no consequences for oneself. Most of us would still have a strong negative reaction to this breach of a moral obligation, even though it has no effect on our interests.
When something is a matter of real, binding obligation, we care about it whether it affects our interests or not. But when something is a matter of epistemic justification, our care seems to be proportionate to its relevance to our interests. This seems to be further evidence against the claim that justification derives from fulfilling epistemic obligations.
BA might explain epistemic normativity, and it might explain our care for the justification of others’ beliefs. The real question to ask, though, is whether that is the best explanation of these things. There are alternative explanations that do not depend on BA and are consistent with hypotheticalism about epistemic normativity, and those alternatives might provide better explanations than BA does. At the very least, then, it is far from clear that hypotheticalists (or anyone else) must accept BA. And once they have given up BA, Siegel’s argument loses all its force.

5. Two Other Arguments
In response to this defense of hypotheticalism, a categoricalist might make either of two additional moves worth considering. One appeals to an alternative interpretation of Siegel’s argument, and the other charges that hypotheticalists cannot explain how people are ever bound by epistemic norms. In this section, I consider each move in turn.
5.1. An Alternative Interpretation of Siegel’s Argument
One could construe Siegel as arguing that no hypotheticalist theory of justification could be justified by its own lights. A hypotheticalist theory of justification is a theory of what cognitive means best promote paradigmatic epistemic ends, but we might ask what justifies us in accepting such a theory on the evidence available. Siegel insists it is not a matter of seeing that doing so promotes further epistemic ends. Instead, he says, it is a matter of seeing the categorically normative connection between the evidence and the theory it justifies (1996: 102). Because hypotheticalism has no account of that categorically normative connection, it lacks the resources to explain its own justification.
This argument begs the question against hypotheticalism. It works only if seeing that evidence supports a theory is something other than seeing that accepting such theories on such evidence tends to promote epistemic ends. That, however, is exactly what hypotheticalists deny. Given hypotheticalism, for evidence E to support theory T is for accepting such theories as T on such evidence as E to be a good means to having true (rather than false) beliefs, or beliefs that explain the evidence well, etc. Seeing that E supports T is seeing the connection between accepting T on E and epistemic ends.
If we take away the question-begging assumption, we can see that a hypotheticalist theory of justification could be justified by its own lights after all. All it takes is for the theory and its evidence to be such that, by the theory’s own lights, accepting such a theory on such evidence is a sufficiently good way to achieve epistemic ends.
5.2. Being Bound by Epistemic Norms
Hypotheticalists should deny that one must be bound by epistemic norms to have justified beliefs. Nevertheless, it is at least plausible that people sometimes are, as a matter of fact, bound by epistemic norms. One might defend categoricalism, then, by insisting only categorical norms can account for this bindingness.​[7]​
Here is how a categoricalist might reason. A hypotheticalist theory of epistemic justification tells us about which cognitive means best promote our epistemic ends. We can imagine a person who cares about such ends, justifiedly accepts a correct theory about which cognitive means best promote them, and meets whatever other descriptive requirements there are for being bound by hypothetical epistemic norms. Still it does not follow that she is bound by those norms. We must also suppose she is bound by a general obligation to do what promotes her epistemic ends, and that obligation amounts to a categorical rule, not a hypothetical one. So, hypotheticalism lacks the resources to explain how a person ever could be bound by epistemic norms.
To see what is wrong with this objection, we need to be very clear about what hypotheticalism does and does not say. Hypotheticalism does say that all epistemic norms are hypothetical and not categorical. It does not say that all norms whatsoever are hypothetical and not categorical. Indeed, practically no one thinks all norms are hypothetical; that would require denying that anything has intrinsic value or that there is anything at all people ought to do independently of their actual ends or goals. The objection might appear to work because it points out that being bound by a hypothetical epistemic norm requires one to be bound by a categorical norm. But there is no good reason to think of that categorical norm as epistemic.
If there is a categorical rule instructing us to do what promotes our epistemic ends, it is just a special case of the more general rule of practical rationality instructing us to do what promotes our ends. That general rule is not part of epistemology, and neither are its particular instances concerning particular kinds of ends. To a certain extent, this is the very point of hypotheticalism: If a person is bound by an epistemic norm, there is nothing peculiar about it. Being bound by epistemic norms is no different from being bound by any other type of hypothetical norm. A hypotheticalist theory of justification does not owe a general account of how people come to be bound by norms. It owes an account of what the epistemic norms are – that is, an account of what cognitive means best promote epistemic ends. Hypotheticalists are perfectly free to say that being bound by hypothetical epistemic norms requires being bound by categorical norms, but they can consistently maintain that those categorical norms are outside epistemology. They are just general norms of practical rationality, applied to the special case of our cognitive conduct. Once we give up BA, there is no need to connect an account of being bound by epistemic norms to a theory of epistemic justification.

6. Conclusion
My aim has not been to prove that hypotheticalism is true, but to show that Siegel’s regress argument against it fails. That argument requires BA, but hypotheticalists can consistently reject BA on good independent grounds. Siegel’s argument does not show that hypotheticalism is self-defeating.
The debate between hypotheticalists and categoricalists is relevant to at least two other important debates within epistemology. One is the debate over epistemological “internalism,” and the other is the debate over epistemological “naturalism.”
According to epistemological internalism, the justification of a belief depends only on the believer’s mental state, not on any considerations “external” to her mental state. Epistemological externalism is the view that something other than one’s mental state contributes to the justification of one’s beliefs. The defensive moves I have suggested for hypotheticalism are externalist in character; they make justification depend on whether one uses cognitive means that do well at promoting epistemic ends, which is a fact external to one’s mental state. There might be internalist versions of hypotheticalism, and it might turn out Siegel-style arguments against them would succeed. If that is the case, then it appears hypotheticalism is committed to externalism. If hypotheticalism has sufficient independent support, then this might be good for the externalist position. On the other hand, if internalism has sufficient independent support, then that might be bad for hypotheticalism.
According to epistemological naturalism, knowledge and justified believing are natural phenomena to be understood using the same empirical, scientific methods we use to understand all other natural phenomena. For their position to work, naturalists need to show how epistemic justification fits into the causal-nomological order science studies, and part of that task is to show how to account for epistemic normativity as a natural phenomenon.
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^1	  Some readers may find the expression ‘hypothetical rule’ misleadingly to suggest a rule not known to exist, but merely posited as a hypothesis. Such readers should substitute the expression ‘instrumental rule’ for ‘hypothetical rule’ throughout this paper.
^2	  Like most claims about categorical rules, this claim about rights is controversial. The point is familiar enough, though. See, for example, Dworkin (1977).
^3	  One advantage of categoricalism, which I do not explore in this paper, is that it makes epistemic value and epistemic rules invariant across possible worlds. Even though very different cognitive strategies promote truth in Cartesian demon-worlds, one might think the rational use of one’s sensory evidence would be the same in those worlds as it is in this one.
^4	  Maybe there is a difference between what is instrumentally rational and what is instrumentally justified. Siegel supposes there is not, and I will do the same.
^5	  The extra condition in J – that A have the sort of evidence the rule indicates – is included because hypothetical epistemic rules are not simple rules of the form ‘If you want x, do y.’ Rather, their form is: ‘If you want x and you have evidence of kind K, then believe p’.
^6	  Craig (1999) develops a theory of knowledge out of the idea that we have an interest in the justification of others’ beliefs. In his view, the purpose of the concept of knowledge is to allow us to distinguish between those who are good sources of information and those who are not.
^7	  Thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasizing the importance of this move to me.
